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1. Introduction
Sellers often use various ways to convey price infor-
mation to consumers. Retailers use different discount
methods to promote products, such as direct price
reductions, percentage discounts, volume discounts,
or vouchers.1 Some restaurants, hotels, and online
booksellers offer a single all-inclusive price, whereas
others divide the price by quoting table service,
breakfast, Internet access, parking, or shipping fees
separately. Airlines and travel agencies charge card
payment fees in different ways. For instance, Wizz
charges a flat £4 per person, whereas Virgin Atlantic
charges 1.3% of the total booking (see BBC News 2009).
Retailers offer store cards with diverse terms such as
“10% off first shop if opened online or 10% off for
the first week if opened in store,” “500 bonus points
on first order,” or “£5 voucher after first purchase.”
Financial product prices are also often framed distinc-
tively: mortgage arrangement fees may be rolled into
the interest rate or not; some loans may specify the
monthly interest rate, whereas others the annual inter-
est rate. Many retailers also change their price presen-
tation formats over time. For example, some products
are sold at a discounted price (say, 30% off) in one
1 For example, to buy a 50 ml whitening toothpaste in a grocery
store, one can choose a Macleans sold at £2.31 with a “buy one
get one free” offer or an Aquafresh that “was £1.93 now is £1.28
saves 65 p.”
week but are offered with a “buy one get one free”
deal in another.2
Strategic choice of price presentation formats, or
simply, price framing, has received relatively little
attention in the economics literature in spite of its
prevalence. If firms use different price frames to com-
pete better for consumers, industry-specific pricing
schemes whose terms facilitate comparisons should
emerge. But persistent variation in price frames in
many markets is more likely to confuse consumers
and harm competition. In recent years, potentially
confusing pricing has attracted the public’s and pol-
icy makers’ attention. A main concern is that sell-
ers deliberately use price framing to obfuscate price
comparisons and soften competition. For example, the
inconsistent use of unit prices (e.g., price per unit ver-
sus price per weight) in British grocery stores was
criticized by consumer watchdogs. In utility markets,
complex tariff structures make it difficult for con-
sumers to understand what type of deal they are on
and how to reduce energy use/costs.3
2 Examples of intertemporal variation of price presentation formats
are easy to find. For instance, cosmetics retailer the Body Shop
offered a “$10 off” for any $20 purchase on November 27, 2012;
it changed to a deal of “up to 50% off” on October 2, 2012; and it
offered a deal of “buy 2 get 2 free” on October 7, 2012.
3 UK’s gas and energy market regulator Ofgem has started to
address complex tariffs (see Ofgem 2011, BBC News 2012). See also
related articles on confusing supermarket and energy market pric-
ing (The Guardian 2011, Which? 2009).
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This paper proposes a model where sellers of a
homogeneous product can choose both price frames
and prices. We assume that consumers might be con-
fused by price framing and so fail to identify the
best available deal in the market.4 Specifically, in our
model firms can choose one of two frames. Con-
sumers may get confused by two prices in differ-
ent frames or two prices in a common but complex
frame (if it is available). If consumers get confused,
they choose one product randomly; otherwise, they
behave rationally.5 We show that in equilibrium firms
adopt mixed strategies that randomize on both price
frames and prices and make strictly positive profits in
an otherwise homogeneous product market (regard-
less of the number of firms). Moreover, if the num-
ber of firms increases, as it becomes more difficult
to obfuscate price comparisons by adopting different
frames, using complex price frames becomes more
effective in confusing consumers. As a result, more
competition induces firms to adopt complex frames
more often, and this may actually boost profits and
harm consumers. Our results suggest that in the pres-
ence of price framing, a standard competition policy
approach may have undesired effects on consumer
welfare.
Marketing research has provided evidence that con-
sumers have difficulties in comparing prices pre-
sented differently or prices presented in similar
but involved formats (see Estelami 1997, Morwitz
et al. 1998, and Thomas and Morwitz 2009). Eco-
nomics experiments (see, e.g., Kalayci and Potters
2011 and Kalayci 2011) show that increasing the num-
ber of product attributes or price scheme dimen-
sions can create confusion and lead to suboptimal
consumer choices. We explore two sources of con-
sumer confusion due to price presentation: frame dif-
ferentiation (when firms adopt different frames) and
frame complexity (when firms use a common but
complex frame).
Consider, for instance, the following two frames:
“price per unit” and “price per kilogram” (these for-
mats are commonly used in grocery stores for vari-
eties of the same fruit/vegetable). In that case, each
price frame is simple, and comparing two prices in
the same frame should be easy. But comparing a price
per unit with a price per kilogram may be difficult
for some consumers. Here, frame differentiation is the
4 Psychology research has long recognized framing effects in de-
cision making (see Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Individuals’
responses to essentially the same decision problem may differ sys-
tematically if the problem is framed differently. Here, we focus on
frames as price presentation modes and on their ability to cause
confusion in price comparisons.
5 With product differentiation, consumers who are confused by
framed prices may also use other heuristics (e.g., rely on brand
names) to make a choice.
only confusion source. Other examples where frame
differentiation is the main confusion source are “price
including VAT” versus “price excluding VAT” (when
the same tax rate applies), flat card payment fees ver-
sus percentage ones, and monthly interest rate versus
annual interest rate quotations on loans.
Now consider the frames “price including ship-
ping fee” and “price plus shipping fee.” Ranking all-
inclusive prices is easy and, as before, comparing
prices in different frames might be difficult. But com-
paring prices that quote the shipping fees separately
may also be confusing if the fees vary across sell-
ers. Here, frame complexity related to the use of a
two-dimensional format is also a source of consumer
confusion. This is true in other settings (e.g., finan-
cial services or utility markets) where some frames
(e.g., multipart tariffs) are intrinsically complex and
it may be difficult for consumers to figure out the
true price.6 For instance, mortgage deals with the ser-
vice fee quoted separately are usually harder to com-
pare than are deals with the service fees rolled in the
interest rate. When both sources of confusion coex-
ist, it is not obvious which of them is more likely to
confuse consumers (i.e., if more consumers get con-
fused when they face prices in different frames or
when they face prices in the same complex frame).
The answer might depend on the microfoundations
of confusion, as we discuss in §2. In this paper, we
consider both possibilities.
Our study predicts both frame and price disper-
sion in the presence of price framing. When the mar-
ket is relatively transparent (say, when duopolists use
the same simple frame), a firm has an incentive to
create more confusion through its price frame choice
(by switching to a different frame) and take advan-
tage of confused consumers. But when the market
is already confusing enough (say, when duopolists
use different frames), a firm has an incentive to
reduce confusion by choosing its rival’s frame and
then undercutting. Because of this conflict, firms mix
on price frames, which generates both price aware
buyers (who compare prices perfectly) and confused
buyers (who shop at random). As a result, firms
also randomize on prices in equilibrium. This predic-
tion is consistent with casual observations in many
markets. Retailers such as grocery stores and online
shops use different price frames and also change
their frames over time. In these markets there is,
moreover, substantial price dispersion. (Note that the
price dispersion literature associates mixed-strategy
equilibria with both cross-sectional and intertemporal
variations.)
6 See, for instance, the European Commission (2007) documents on
the integration of EU mortgage credit markets.
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The nature of equilibrium depends on which source
of confusion leads to more confused consumers. The
intuition is best illustrated in duopoly. If frame dif-
ferentiation leads to more confused consumers than
does frame complexity, then when a firm switches
from one frame to the other, more or fewer consumers
get confused depending on its rival’s frame. In effect,
there is no clear ranking (on average) among prices
associated with different frames. For example, with
two simple frames “price per unit” versus “price per
kg,” our model predicts no significant price differ-
ences on average across different price formats. By
contrast, in markets where frame complexity leads to
more confused consumers, when a firm switches from
a relatively simple frame to a more complex one, more
consumers get confused regardless of the rival’s frame
choice. Then, the more complex frame is associated
with higher prices. Woodward (2003) and Woodward
and Hall (2010) provide evidence that mortgage mar-
ket deals with the arrangement fees rolled into the
interest rate are on average better than the deals with
separate fees.7
In our setting, deliberately choosing different or
complex price frames is a way to make price com-
parisons difficult that ultimately allows suppliers of
otherwise homogeneous products to obtain positive
profits. We show that a decrease in concentration
weakens firms’ ability to frame differentiate (if the
number of frames is fixed) and makes them over-
load on frame complexity. In particular, in fragmented
oligopolies, firms tend to use the more complex
price frame almost surely and industry profits are
always bounded away from zero. A decrease in con-
centration has a positive effect on consumer wel-
fare (depresses the prices) but also a negative one
(higher market complexity and less competitive pres-
sure). In the presence of price framing, when the lat-
ter effect dominates, an increase in the number of
firms boosts industry profits and harms consumers.8
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) provide evidence that
in the S&P index fund market where multidimen-
sional fee schemes prevail, a decrease in concentration
between 1995 and 1999 indeed triggered an increase
in the average price.
7 In this paper, consumers who lack the ability to compare prices
are assumed to lack the ability to understand the equilibrium rela-
tionship between frames and prices. We discuss this assumption
more formally in §2.
8 Lower concentration can also lead to higher prices in other
price dispersion models (e.g., Rosenthal 1980, Janssen and Moraga-
González 2004) where competition induces firms to exploit unin-
formed consumers rather than to fight for shoppers. However, our
result stems from a novel effect of lower concentration on firms’
framing incentives and the overall market complexity.
1.1. Related Literature
Recent economics research investigates price com-
plexity and firms’ intentional attempts to degrade
the quality of information to the consumers. Ellison
and Ellison (2009) find empirical evidence on obfus-
cation strategies in online markets where retailers
deliberately create more confusing websites to make
it harder for the consumers to figure out the total
price. Carlin (2009) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)
address this issue in the information search frame-
work where each firm chooses both a price and a price
complexity level. They argue that if it is more costly
for consumers to assess complex prices, each firm will
individually increase price complexity to reduce con-
sumers’ incentives to gather information and weaken
price competition.9 Our model also considers price
complexity, but it incorporates the effect of price
frame differentiation and regards it as an important
source of market complexity. In particular, in our
model, how a firm’s frame choice affects price com-
petition also depends on rivals’ frame choices. This
strategic dependence induces firms to mix frames.
So our model predicts that firms tend to adopt differ-
ent price frames or change their frames over time.
In a closely related paper, Piccione and Spiegler
(2012) also examine frame-price competition. They
focus on a duopoly model with a more general frame
structure and mainly examine the relation between
equilibrium properties and the frame structure. Our
duopoly example in §2 can be regarded as a spe-
cial case of their model. However, we develop an
oligopoly model to analyze the impact of greater com-
petition on firms’ strategies and market outcomes in
the presence of price framing. In addition, our anal-
ysis explores the interaction between frame differen-
tiation and frame complexity as sources of consumer
confusion.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature on
how shrouding a price component or making it less
salient affects consumers’ price perception and mar-
ket outcomes. Ellison (2005) studies an add-on pricing
model in which consumers have imperfect informa-
tion about the prices of add-ons and need to pay a
search cost to find them out. He shows that if the con-
sumers who have a low valuation for the add-ons are
also more price sensitive, the existence of add-ons can
9 In an all-or-nothing search model, Carlin (2009) assumes that if
a firm increases its price complexity, consumers regard the entire
market as being more complex. Then, as information gathering
becomes more costly, they are more likely to remain uninformed
and shop randomly. In a sequential search model, Ellison and
Wolitzky (2012) introduce a convex search cost function. If a firm
makes its price information more costly to process, consumers are
less likely to search further. See also Wilson (2010) for a two-
stage model of obfuscation with asymmetric equilibrium complex-
ity levels.
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soften price competition and sustain positive profits.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) endogenize shrouded add-
on price information by introducing boundedly ratio-
nal consumers who ignore the add-on price if no firm
advertises it. (See Hossain and Morgan 2006, Chetty
et al. 2009, and Brown et al. 2010 for related empiri-
cal work.) Our model does not explore hidden price
information, but while all price information is avail-
able, framing affects choice because of consumers’
limited cognitive abilities.
Finally, our study contributes to the growing liter-
ature on bounded rationality and industrial organi-
zation (see the survey by Ellison 2006 and Spiegler
2011). In our model, the inability of boundedly
rational consumers to compare framed prices leads
to equilibrium frame dispersion. Our study is also
related to the literature on consumer search and price
dispersion (see Baye et al. 2006 for a survey). But we
focus on how firms may confuse consumers by mix-
ing their frame choices, so in our model price disper-
sion is a by-product of frame dispersion.
2. The Duopoly Model
This section illustrates in a duopoly example the coex-
istence of frame and price dispersion and how the
relative importance of frame differentiation and frame
complexity affects the nature of equilibrium.
2.1. Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with
two sellers, firms 1 and 2. The constant marginal cost
of production is normalized to zero. There is a unit
mass of consumers, each demanding at most one unit
of the product and willing to pay at most 1. There are
two possible price presentation formats, referred to as
frames A and B. We assume that frame A is a simple
frame (e.g., an all-inclusive price) and that frame B
is a different and possibly more complex frame (e.g.,
a multidimensional price).
Definition 1. A frame is simple if two prices pre-
sented in this common frame are perfectly compara-
ble. A frame is complex if not all consumers are able to
perfectly compare two prices presented in this com-
mon frame.
Note that we allow frame B to be also a simple
frame (but different from A). This is the case, for
instance, if A is “price per unit” and B is “price per
kilogram.” Each firm can choose just one of the two
frames, and the firms simultaneously and noncoop-
eratively choose frames and prices p1 and p2. The
timing reflects that in many cases both price frames
and prices can be changed relatively easily. If chang-
ing price frames takes longer than adjusting prices, a
two-stage game where firms first commit to frames
and then compete in prices would be more suitable.
Table 1 Confused Consumers
zi\zj A B
A 0 = 0 1
B 1 2
We discuss a sequential version of our model in the
end of this section.
Price framing affects consumer choice as follows.
If both firms choose the same simple frame A, nobody
gets confused and all consumers buy the cheaper
product with a positive net surplus. Formally, in this
case, firm i’s demand is
qi4pi1 pj5=

1 if pi < pj and pi ≤ 11
1
2 if pi = pj ≤ 11
0 if pi > pj or pi > 11
for i1 j ∈ 81129 and i 6= j0 (1)
If the two firms adopt different frames, a fraction
1 > 0 of consumers get confused and are unable to
compare the two prices. The remaining 1 − 1 frac-
tion of consumers can still accurately compare prices.
In this duopoly example, for simplicity, we assume
that confused consumers shop at random: half of
them buy from firm 1 and the other half buy from
firm 2. In general, consumers might favor the firm
adopting the simpler frame whenever they get con-
fused between different frames. The oligopoly model
in §3 allows for such preferences.
If both firms choose the same frame B, a fraction
2 ≥ 0 of consumers get confused and shop randomly.
Note that if frame B is also a simple (but different)
frame, then 2 = 0. Table 1 shows the fraction of con-
fused consumers for all possible frame profiles, where
zi is the frame chosen by firm i and zj is the frame
chosen by firm j .
Notice that the simple frame A can cause confusion
only when it is combined with a different frame B,
whereas if 2 > 0, frame B is confusing itself and
can obfuscate price comparisons even if both firms
adopt it.10
Firm i’s profit is
i4pi1 pj1 zi1 zj5= pi ·
[
1
2zi1 zj + qi4pi1 pj541 −zi1 zj 5
]
1
where zi1 zj is presented in Table 1 and qi4pi1 pj5 is
given by (1).
In our model, confused consumers do not pay more
than their reservation price, which is normalized to 1.
10 Note that our main results hold qualitatively (though the analysis
would be more involved) even if a fraction of consumers also get
confused when both firms use frame A (i.e., when frame A also
involves some complexity), provided that 0 ≤ 2 and 0 6= 1.
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Arguably, if price framing prevents a consumer from
comparing competing offers, it may also prevent her
from accurately comparing framed prices and her
willingness to pay. In this case, one way to justify our
assumption is that consumers can figure out at check-
out (or after purchase) if a product’s price exceeds
their valuation and can decline to buy it (or return it).
Given such ex post participation constraint, the firms
have no incentive to charge prices above 1.11 In addi-
tion, confused consumers are assumed to be bound-
edly rational in the sense that they are unable to
understand the relationship between price frames and
prices. That is, even if a particular frame is always
associated with higher prices, confused consumers are
unable to infer prices from the price frame. One jus-
tification for this assumption is that consumers who
get confused by framed prices have limited cogni-
tive abilities and cannot be expected to understand
the mixed-strategy market equilibrium. In addition, in
our setting, an equilibrium where the more complex
frame is associated with higher prices only occurs
when 1 < 2, i.e., when frame complexity leads to
more confused consumers than does frame differen-
tiation. But this is more likely in markets where the
consumers participate infrequently (e.g., the mortgage
market), and so they may not have a chance to learn
to infer prices from frames.
Our model explores two sources of consumer con-
fusion: frame differentiation (i.e., prices are presented
in incompatible formats) and frame complexity (i.e.,
prices are presented in a common involved format).
If 2 = 0, because frame B is also a simple (but differ-
ent) frame, frame differentiation is the only source of
consumer confusion and it is captured by 1. If 2 > 0,
frame complexity is also a source of consumer confu-
sion. When consumers face the frame profile 4B1B5, a
fraction 2 of consumers get confused solely because
of frame complexity. When consumers face the frame
profile 4A1B5, a fraction 1 of consumers get confused
because of frame incompatibility. (In the latter case,
frame incompatibility might also result because the
profile involves a complex price and so both sources
of confusion may be conceptually related.) The rank-
ing of 1 and 2 reflects the relative importance of
frame differentiation and frame complexity as sources
of consumer confusion.
11 Carlin (2009) and Piccione and Spiegler (2012) make the same
assumption that confused consumers do not pay more than their
willingness to pay. Alternatively, suppose that a confused consumer
cannot perfectly compare prices to her willingness to pay, and as
a result she may pay up to some v > 1. This general setting is less
tractable. However, in the special case with 2 = 0, we can show
that our main results hold qualitatively if v < 2. That is, there is no
pure-strategy equilibrium and in the symmetric equilibrium firms
mix on both frames and prices (and the price distribution has a
mass point on v).
The relative role of the two confusion sources and
their relevance in the marketplace stems from the
microfoundations of consumer confusion. We present
below two possible interpretations.
Frame differentiation is more confusing than is frame
complexity 41 > 25. When consumers face a simple
frame A (e.g., an all-inclusive price) and a complex
frame B (e.g., a multidimensional price), to compare
the two offers they eventually need to convert the
price in frame B into a single all-inclusive price. Imag-
ine that because of differences in numeracy skills,
some consumers are able to make a correct conver-
sion, whereas others are not. We assume that those
who are unable to convert get confused and end up
choosing randomly. When consumers face two offers
in frame B, those who are able to convert B into
an all-inclusive price should still be able to com-
pare. Meanwhile, those with poor numeracy skills
may now benefit from format similarity. For exam-
ple, if frame B is a two-dimensional price and one
offer dominates the other in both dimensions, then
even those who are unable to convert will make the
right choice.12 In general, similarity between the price
formats may induce consumers to use a different
comparison procedure and this might mitigate the
confusion caused by frame complexity.
Frame complexity is more confusing than is frame dif-
ferentiation 42 > 15. Consumers might be able to
convert a price presented in frame B into a simple
all-inclusive price in frame A, but this requires costly
information processing and consumers may decide
whether or not to make the conversion. When they
give up making the conversion, they end up confused.
If confusion stems from this conversion cost, a con-
sumer is more likely to give up the effort when she
compares two complex prices than when she com-
pares one complex price with a simple one. Then, the
frame profile 4B1B5 leads to more confused consumers
than does the profile 4A1B5.
We use a reduced-form approach and do not explic-
itly model the specific comparison procedures that
may lead to confusion. In reality, there may be several
confusion mechanisms so that both cases of 1 > 2
and 2 >1 are worth exploring.13
12 Even if there is no clear dominance relationship between offers,
frame similarity may still facilitate the comparison of prices framed
in B. Take, for example, two offers in frame B: (1) £32078 plus £4075
shipping, and (2) £32097 plus £4032 shipping. When a consumer
compares them, she may assess different components separately.
The base price in (2) is about 20 p higher than in (1), but the ship-
ping fee in (2) is about 40 p cheaper than in (1), so (2) is a better deal
than (1). However, if the consumer needs to compare, say, (1) with
a single price £37025, it seems plausible that she has to convert (1)
into an all-inclusive price first, which is eventually harder and so
it may block the comparison.
13 Another justification for the cases 1 > 2 and 2 > 1 relates to
costly information processing. Suppose that frame differentiation
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Finally, in our setting confused consumers’ choices
are assumed to be totally independent of firms’ prices.
This is a tractable way to capture the idea that con-
fusion in price comparisons reduces consumers’ price
sensitivity and weakens price competition. A more
realistic (but less tractable) model might assume that
price framing leads to noisy price comparisons. Sup-
pose firm i charges a price pi. If it uses the simple
frame A, consumers will understand its price per-
fectly. In contrast, if it uses frame B, consumers will
perceive its price as pi + i, where i is a random
variable that captures possible misperceptions. Then,
for example, if firm i adopts the relatively complex
frame B and firm j adopts frame A, consumers per-
ceive their prices as pi + i and pj , respectively. As a
result, demand becomes less elastic compared to the
case where both firms use frame A. (This is reflected
by 1 > 0 in our current setting.) But consumers’
choices still depend somewhat on the relative price
pi − pj . We discuss this alternative model in §4 and
relate the relative ranking of 1 and 2 to the correla-
tion between the errors.14
2.2. Analysis
Let us now characterize the duopoly equilibrium.15
We first show that there is no pure-strategy fram-
ing equilibrium, and then we prove the existence and
uniqueness of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium. All proofs missing from the text are relegated
to Appendix A.
Lemma 1. If 1 6= 2, there is no equilibrium where
both firms choose price frames deterministically.
Proof. (a) Suppose both firms choose frame A
for sure. Then, the unique candidate equilibrium
entails marginal-cost pricing and zero profit. But if
imposes an information processing cost d and frame complexity
imposes a separate cost c. Then it costs d + c to compare a price
in A with a price in B, and it costs c+ c to compare two prices in
frame B. So which frame profile leads to more confused consumers
depends on the relative size of d and c.
14 Notice that a noisy price comparison model might be related to
the quantal response equilibrium (QRE). An interpretation of QRE
is that players make random errors when choosing a strategy (even
when they know what is the best strategy) but still choose a strat-
egy with a higher expected payoff with a higher probability. Our
benchmark model of consumer confusion can be seen as a fully
“irrational” version of the QRE. In this case, the fact that consumers
do not infer prices from frames is irrelevant: even if consumers
know what is the best deal, they may still make choice mistakes.
15 Our duopoly example can be regarded as a reduced-form model
of the bi-symmetric graph case in Piccione and Spiegler (2012). All
their results apply to our model, but in our setting it is subtler
to exclude the possibility of firms adopting deterministic frames.
In their model, consumers are always able to perfectly compare
prices in the same frame (i.e., frame differentiation is the only con-
fusion source), so it is easy to see that firms never adopt determin-
istic frames.
firm i unilaterally deviates to frame B and a positive
price (no greater than 1), it makes a positive profit.
A contradiction.
(b) Suppose both firms choose frame B for sure.
For clarity, consider two cases. (b1) If 2 = 1 (and so
1 < 2), at the unique candidate equilibrium pi = 1
and i = 1/2 for all i. But if firm i unilaterally
deviates to frame A and price pi = 1 − , it earns
41 − 561/2 + 41 − 157 > 1/2 for a small enough .
(b2) If 2 < 1, the unique candidate equilibrium dic-
tates mixed strategy pricing according to a cumula-
tive distribution function (cdf) on 6p0117 as in Varian
(1980), and each firm’s expected profit is 2/2 =
p041 − 2/25. If 1 > 2, firm i can make a higher
profit 1/2 > 2/2 by deviating to frame A and price
pi = 1. If 1 < 2, firm i can make a higher profit
p041 −1/25 > p041 −2/25 by deviating to frame A
and price pi = p0. Both (b1) and (b2) lead to a
contradiction.
(c) Suppose firm i chooses frame A and firm j
chooses B. Again consider two cases. (c1) If 1 = 1,
the unique candidate equilibrium entails pi = 1 and
i = 1/2 for all i. But then firm j is better off deviat-
ing to frame A and pj = 1 − , in which case its profit
is 1 −  > 1/2 for any  < 1/2. (c2) If 1 < 1, then the
unique candidate equilibrium is again of Varian type
and dictates mixed strategy pricing according to a cdf
on 6p0117, with each firm earning 1/2 = p041 −1/25.
But if firm j deviates to frame A and price pj = p0, it
makes a higher profit p0. Both (c1) and (c2) lead to a
contradiction.16 
If both firms use the same simple frame (that is,
A or, for 2 = 0, also B), they compete à la Bertrand
and make zero profits. A unilateral deviation to the
other frame yields positive profits because some con-
sumers are confused by “frame differentiation” and
shop at random. For 2 > 0, Lemma 1 also shows that
in equilibrium, the firms cannot rely on only one con-
fusion source. Otherwise, a firm using frame B has a
unilateral incentive to deviate to the simpler frame A
to attract price aware consumers. But if 1 = 2 > 0,
there is an equilibrium with both firms using frame B
because a unilateral deviation to frame A does not
change the composition of consumers in the market.
In continuation, we focus on the general case with
1 6= 2. By Lemma 1, in any candidate equilibrium
at least one firm mixes its frame choice. Therefore,
there is a positive probability that firms have bases of
fully aware consumers and also a positive probabil-
ity that they have bases of confused consumers who
cannot compare prices at all. The conflict between the
16 Note that although parts (a) and (c) used the fact that consumers
can compare prices perfectly when both firms use frame A, our
result still holds even if 0 > 0 provided that 0 6= 1 (the logic in
(b) applies).
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incentives to fully exploit confused consumers and
to vigorously compete for the aware ones leads to
the absence of pure-strategy pricing equilibria. The
proof of the following result is standard and therefore
omitted.
Lemma 2. If 1 6= 2, there is no equilibrium where
both firms charge prices deterministically.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that any duopoly equilib-
ria must exhibit dispersion in both price frames and
prices. Let us now focus on the symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium 41 FA1 FB5 where each firm assigns
probability  ∈ 40115 to frame A and 1 − to frame B,
and when a firm uses frame z ∈ 8A1B9, it chooses its
price randomly according to a cdf Fz that is strictly
increasing on its connected support Sz = 6pz01 pz17.
We first show that Fz is continuous (except when
2 = 1).
Lemma 3. In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
41 FA1 FB5, the price distribution associated with frame A
(FA) is always atomless, and the one associated with
frame B (FB) is atomless whenever 2 < 10
Denote by
xz4p5≡ 1 − Fz4p5
the probability that a firm using frame z charges a
price higher than p. Suppose firm j is employing the
equilibrium strategy. Then, if firm i uses frame A and
charges a price p ∈ 6pA0 1 pA1 7, its expected profit is
4A1p5=p{xA4p5+41−561/2+41−15xB4p57}0 (2)
With probability , the rival is also using A so that the
firms compete à la Bertrand. With probability 1 −,
the rival is using B, so that a fraction 1 of consumers
are confused (by frame differentiation) and shop ran-
domly, and the firms compete à la Bertrand for the
remaining 1 −1 fully aware consumers.
If instead firm i uses B and charges p ∈ 6pB0 1 pB1 7, its
expected profit is
4B1p5 = p{61/2 + 41 −15xA4p57
+ 41 −562/2 + 41 −25xB4p57
}
0 (3)
With probability , the rival uses A so that a fraction
1 of consumers are confused (by frame differentia-
tion) and shop randomly. With probability 1 − , the
rival also uses B so that a fraction 2 of consumers are
confused (by frame complexity) and shop randomly.
(Note that the profit functions apply for any price p
because xz4p5= 1 for p < pz0 and xz4p5= 0 for p > pz1.)
The nature of the equilibrium depends on which
source leads to more confusion. Intuitively, when
1 <2, if a firm shifts from frame A to B, more con-
sumers get confused regardless of its rival’s frame
choice. Thus, each firm charges higher prices when it
uses frame B than when it uses frame A. For 1 >2,
when a firm shifts from frame A to B, more consumers
get confused if its rival uses A, whereas fewer con-
sumers get confused if its rival uses B. Hence, there is
no obvious monotonic relationship between the prices
associated with A and B. Below we analyze these two
cases separately.
• Frame differentiation is more confusing than is frame
complexity: 0 ≤ 2 <1.
The unique symmetric equilibrium in this case
dictates FA4p5 = FB4p5 and SA = SB = 6p0117 (see
Appendix A for the proof). That is, a firm’s price is
independent of its frame. Let F 4p5 be the common
price cdf and x4p5 ≡ 1 − F 4p5. Then, using the profit
functions (2) and (3) and the frame indifference con-
dition 4A1p5=4B1p5, we obtain
= 1 − 1
21 −2
0 (4)
When 2 = 0 (i.e., frame differentiation is the sole con-
fusion source), firms are equally likely to adopt each
frame (i.e., = 1/2). When 2 > 0 (i.e., frame complex-
ity is also a confusion source), firms adopt it more
often (i.e., 1 − increases with 2).
Note that (4) can be rewritten as 41 − 51 = 1 +
41−52 and it actually requires the expected number
of confused consumers to be the same when a firm
uses frame A (the left-hand side) and when it uses
frame B (the right-hand side). As in duopoly, there are
only two types of consumers (the confused and the
fully aware), and then the expected market composi-
tion along the equilibrium path does not depend on
a firm’s frame choice. Since the pricing balances the
incentives to extract surplus from the confused and
to compete for the fully aware, a frame-independent
market composition implies frame-independent pric-
ing. This explains why FA = FB. (This result may not
hold if the confused are biased toward the simple
frame as formally shown in the oligopoly model.)
Let  be a firm’s equilibrium profit. Since all prices
on 6p0117 should result in the same profit, we obtain
(e.g., from 4A115 by using x415= 0)
 = 
2
1
2421 −25
0 (5)
Note that  increases with both 1 and 2. That is,
confusion (regardless of its source) always boosts
firms’ payoffs and harms consumers.
Finally, the common price cdf F 4p5 can be derived
from the mixed-strategy equilibrium constant profit
condition, 4A1p5 = . Explicitly, x4p5 = 1 − F 4p5
solves
x4p5+ 41 −561/2 + 41 −15x4p57=

p
0 (6)
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Then the boundary price p0 is defined by x4p05 = 1
and one can check that p0 ∈ 40115. The price cdf for
a higher 1 (2) first-order stochastically dominates
that for a lower 1 (2). This is consistent with the
observation that confusion benefits firms and harms
consumers. We summarize these findings below.
Proposition 1. In the duopoly model with 0 ≤ 2
< 1, there is a unique symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium where each firm adopts frame A with probabil-
ity  and frame B with probability 1 − , and  is given
in (4). Regardless of its frame choice, each firm chooses its
price randomly according to a cdf F , which is defined by (6)
on 6p0117. Each firm’s equilibrium profit is  given in (5).
Notice that the equilibrium price dispersion is
driven by firms’ obfuscation effort through random
framing but not necessarily by the coexistence of price
aware and confused consumers. This is best seen in
the polar case with 1 = 1 and 2 = 0, where con-
sumers are always homogeneous both ex ante and
ex post (i.e., once a pair of frames is realized, either
all consumers are confused or all of them are fully
aware), but price dispersion still persists.
• Frame complexity is more confusing than is frame dif-
ferentiation: 0<1 <2.
In this case, the unique symmetric equilibrium dic-
tates adjacent supports SA = 6pA0 1 pˆ7 and SB = 6pˆ117 (see
Appendix A for the proof). In particular, if 2 = 1,
then SA = 6pA0 115 and SB = 819. That is, frame B is
always associated with higher prices in frame A. This
happens because when a firm shifts from frame A
to frame B, regardless of the rival’s frame, more con-
sumers get confused given that 1 <2.
With adjacent price supports, in the profit func-
tion 4A1p5 (in expression (2)), xB4p5 = 1 for any
p ∈ SA because frame B is always associated with
higher prices. Similarly, in the profit function 4B1p5
(in expression (3)), xA4p5 = 0 for any p ∈ SB. Then
from the indifference condition 4A1 pˆ5= 4B1 pˆ5, we
can derive
= 1 − 1
2
0 (7)
Note that the probability of using the complex
frame B (1−) decreases with the complexity index 2,
unlike the previous case (with 1 >2). This happens
because when confusion from frame complexity dom-
inates, the prices associated with frame B are already
high (so a rival using frame B is a softer competi-
tor). This makes more attractive the use of frame A
together with a relatively high price (but still lower
than pˆ). Hence, for fixed 1, the overall relationship
between 1− and 2 is nonmonotonic: when 2 <1,
the probability of using frame B rises with 2, and
when 2 >1, it decreases with 2.
Each firm’s equilibrium profit  is given by 4B115:
 = 1
(
1 − 1
22
)
0 (8)
As before, it can be verified that this equilibrium
profit increases (and so consumer surplus decreases)
with both 1 and 2.
Finally, Fz4p5 is determined by 4z1p5 = . Explic-
itly, we have
xA4p5+ 41 −541 −1/25=

p
(9)
and
1/2 + 41 −562/2 + 41 −25xB4p57=

p
0 (10)
The boundary prices pA0 and pˆ are defined by
xA4p
A
0 5= 1 and xA4pˆ5 = 0, respectively. Both of them
are well defined with pA0 < pˆ. We summarize these
results below.
Proposition 2. Consider the duopoly model.
(i) If 1 < 2 < 1, there is a unique symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium where each firm adopts frame A with
probability  and frame B with probability 1 − , and 
is given in (7). When a firm uses frame A, it chooses its
price randomly according to the cdf FA defined on 6p
A
0 1 pˆ7,
which solves (9); when a firm uses frame B, the price cdf
is FB defined on 6pˆ117, which solves (10). Each firm’s equi-
librium profit  is given in (8).
(ii) If 1 < 2 = 1, the equilibrium has the same form
except that FB is a degenerate distribution on 819 and FA is
defined on 6pA0 115.
When 2 → 1, Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that
the firms use frame B almost surely (→ 0), and the
price cdf’s associated with B in the two cases tend to
coincide. So when 1 = 2 > 0, there is a unique sym-
metric equilibrium in which both firms use frame B.17
Our analysis focuses on cases where price fram-
ing is a short term decision. However, there are also
cases where changes in price frames might take time
or be costly (say, they require to redesign the contract
form), whereas firms still can adjust prices frequently.
In this scenario, it is more appropriate to consider a
two-stage game where firms commit to frames before
competing in prices. Below we discuss the equilib-
ria in such a sequential-move variant of our duopoly
model.
When 1 > 2, there are two pure-strategy equilib-
ria where firms choose different frames (if they can
coordinate successfully). In the second stage, firms
mix on prices (as in part (c) in the proof of Lemma 1)
and each firm earns 1/2. There is also an equilib-
rium where firms mix their frame choices in the first
stage. This equilibrium is more likely when frame
17 Note that when 1 = 2 > 0, the frame profile 4A1B5 cannot form
part of an equilibrium. Otherwise, the firm using frame B would
have an incentive to switch to frame A and undercut its rival, as
we argued in part (c) in the proof of Lemma 1.
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coordination is hard to achieve. More specifically, it
can be shown that in the mixed-strategy equilibrium
each firm adopts frame A with probability equal to (4)
and makes profit equal to (5). That is, in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the sequential-move game, the
frequency of using each frame and the welfare are the
same as in the simultaneous-move game.
When 1 < 2, there is a unique equilibrium in
which both firms adopt the complex frame B. This
is qualitatively different from the simultaneous-move
setting. The outcome in the pricing stage echoes
part (b) in the proof of Lemma 1, and each firm
makes 2/2 (which is greater than (8), the profit in
our simultaneous-move model). In sum, in a two-
stage game, a pure-strategy equilibrium is more likely
to happen and firms tend to refrain from mixing on
frames. But there is still consumer confusion in the
market either because firms adopt different frames or
because they use complex frames.
3. The Oligopoly Model
In this section, we develop a general oligopoly ver-
sion of the model to analyze the impact of compe-
tition on market outcomes in the presence of price
framing.
Consider a homogeneous product market with
n≥ 2 identical sellers and, as before, two frames—
A and B: A is a simple frame so that all prices in
this frame are comparable; B is possibly complex so
that with probability 2 ≥ 0, the consumers cannot
compare prices in this frame. Consumers can also be
confused by frame differentiation and so unable to
compare prices in different frames with probability
1 > 0. In continuation, we focus on the case where
confusion due to frame differentiation is indepen-
dent of confusion due to frame complexity. However,
depending on the microfoundations, the two types of
confusion may be correlated. We argue in §4 that our
analysis and its main insights carry over to the case
where the two confusion sources are dependent.
In duopoly, for any realized frame profile, there
is at most one confusion source, and so there are
at most two types of consumers: fully aware (who
buy the cheaper product) and totally confused (who
shop randomly). With more than two firms, for a
realized frame profile (e.g., 4A1B1B5), both confusion
sources might be present. Thus, there are up to four
groups of consumers: 41−1541−25 fully aware ones,
141−25 consumers confused only by frame differen-
tiation, 41 −152 consumers confused only by frame
complexity, and 12 consumers confused by both
confusion sources.18 Below is an illustrative example.
18 Note that in our model consumer confusion occurs at the frame
level. For example, across all pairs of one A offer and one B offer,
a consumer is able to compare either all or none.
Example 1. Consider a case with three firms. Sup-
pose firm 1 uses frame A, and firms 2 and 3 use
frame B1 respectively. The following graphs show the
comparability among options for the four types of
consumers. If two offers are comparable, they are con-
nected; if they are not comparable, there is no link
between them.
Fully
aware
Confused by frame
differentiation
Confused by frame
complexity
Fully
confused
A
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
B
Moreover, with more than two firms, even if there
is only one confusion source, a consumer may be only
partially confused, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Consider a case with three firms.
Firm 1 uses frame A and charges price p1, and firms 2
and 3 use frame B and charge p2 and p3, respectively.
If 1 = 1 and 2 = 0, then only frame differentiation
causes confusion. All consumers can accurately com-
pare p2 with p3 since they are presented in the same
frame but cannot compare p1 with either p2 or p3.
Thus, consumers are neither fully aware nor totally
confused.
A major question is, How does a consumer choose
from a “partially ordered” set in which some pairs
of alternatives are comparable but others are not?
Note that this is not an issue in the duopoly model.
To address this consumer choice issue, following
the literature on incomplete preferences, we adopt a
dominance-based consumer choice rule. The basic idea
is that consumers only choose, according to some
stochastic rule, from the “maximal” alternatives that
are not dominated by any other comparable alterna-
tive. From now on, we use “dominated” in the fol-
lowing sense.
Definition 2. For a consumer, firm i’s offer
4zi1 pi5 ∈ 8A1B9× 60117 is dominated if there exists firm
j 6= i that offers alternative 4zj1 pj < pi5 and the two
offers are comparable.
Notice that for any consumer, the set of maxi-
mal or undominated alternatives is well defined and
nonempty (for example, the firm that charges the low-
est price in the market is never dominated), and it
can be constructed, for example, by conducting pair-
wise comparisons among all alternatives.19 The exam-
ple below illustrates our consumer choice rule.
19 In our model, the comparability of two offers is independent of
their comparability with other available offers. This excludes tran-
sitivity of comparability. Consider a consumer who can compare
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Example 3. Consider Example 2 and let p1 <
p2 < p3.
(A, p1)
(B, p2 )
(B, p3)
Then firm 3’s offer is dominated by firm 2’s offer
given that p2 < p3. Offers in different frames are not
comparable since 1 = 1, so both firm 1’s offer and
firm 2’s offer survive. Then consumers buy from
firm 1 with some probability and from firm 2 with
the complementary probability.
In this example, there is only one consumer group
(all buyers are confused only by frame differentiation)
so that all consumers face the same set of undomi-
nated offers. In general, when 112 ∈ 40115 the set
of undominated alternatives varies across consumer
groups.
Now we can formally state our dominance-based con-
sumer choice rule as follows:
1. Consumers first eliminate all dominated offers in
the market.
2. They then buy from the undominated firms
according to the following stochastic purchase rule
(which is independent of prices): (i) if all these
firms use the same frame, they share the market
equally; (ii) if among them nA ≥ 1 firms use frame A
and nB ≥ 1 firms use frame B, then each undomi-
nated A firm is chosen with probability 4nA1nB5/nA
and each undominated B firm is chosen with prob-
ability 61 − 4nA1nB57/nB, where 4 · 5 ∈ 40115 is
nondecreasing in nA and nonincreasing in nB and
4nA1nB5≥ nA/4nA +nB5.
Note that 4nA1nB5 ≥ nA/4nA + nB5 in 2(ii) allows
the consumers to favor the simple frame A.20 This
generalizes the random purchase assumption in our
duopoly example. 4 · 5 < 1 excludes the possibility
that all consumers favor the simple frame. (For exam-
ple, some consumers might be overconfident in their
ability to compare offers, so they do not favor any
particular frame but may actually make mistakes.)
The monotonicity assumption in 2(ii) means that the
presence of more undominated firms with one frame
increases the overall probability that consumers buy
offers in different frames but cannot compare offers in frame B.
Then the presence of an offer in frame A (which is comparable with
any of the B offers) does not help the consumer compare offers in
frame B directly. This might be the case when the consumers use
different procedures to compare prices in different formats and to
compare prices in a complex format.
20 There is evidence that people have preferences for simpler
options, especially when they face many alternatives. See, for
instance, Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) and the references therein.
from them. Note that the uniformly random pur-
chase rule 4nA1nB5 = nA/4nA + nB5 satisfies all the
conditions.
For the rest of the paper, let
k ≡411 k5
denote the probability that a consumer buys from the
A firm when there are other k undominated B firms
to choose from. Then, 2(ii) implies that 8k9n−1k=1 is a
nonincreasing sequence: when more B firms survive,
the undominated A firm has less demand, and k ∈
61/41+k5115. Note that k = 1/41+k5 is the uniformly
random purchase rule when consumers have no bias
toward the simple frame.
Recall that in duopoly the type of market equi-
librium depends on whether frame differentiation or
frame complexity is more confusing. The same is
true in the general case. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 ana-
lyze the corresponding symmetric equilibrium and
the impact of greater competition for 1 < 2 and
1 >2, respectively.
Before we proceed, let us summarize two main
findings. First, when 2 > 0 (i.e., when frame B is
complex), greater competition tends to induce firms
to use frame B more often. In particular, when there
is a large number of firms, they use frame B almost
surely. Intuitively, with more firms it becomes harder
for them to frame differentiate (given the fixed num-
ber of frames), so firms rely more on frame complex-
ity to soften price competition. Second, when 2 > 0,
industry profit is bounded away from zero even when
there are an infinite number of firms, and greater com-
petition can increase industry profit and harm con-
sumers (i.e., consumers may actually pay more in a
more competitive market).
3.1. Frame Differentiation Is More Confusing
Than Frame Complexity 41 >25
We analyze now the case where consumers are more
likely to be confused by frame differentiation than by
frame complexity (that is, 1 >2). For simplicity, we
first focus on the polar case in which prices in dif-
ferent frames are always incomparable (i.e., 1 = 1).
We then discuss how the main results can be extended
to the case with 1 < 1. All proofs missing from the
text are relegated to Appendix B.1.
As shown in the online supplementary document
(https://sites.google.com/site/jidongzhou77/research/
Confusion_Supplement_Jan2013.pdf), there is no
pure-strategy equilibrium when 2 > 0. If 2 = 0 (i.e.,
if both frames are simple) and n≥ 4, there are always
asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in which each
frame is used by more than one firm and all firms
price at marginal cost. However, for any n≥ 2, there
is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
firms make positive profits.
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3.1.1. A Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium.
Let 41 FA1 FB5 be a symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium, where  is the probability of using frame A and
Fz is a price cdf associated with frame z ∈ 8A1B9. Let
6pz01 p
z
17 be the support of Fz. As in Lemma 3, it is clear
that Fz is atomless everywhere (as now 2 < 1). For
the rest of the paper,
P kn−1 ≡Ckn−1k41 −5n−k−1
denotes the probability that k firms among n− 1
ones adopt frame A at equilibrium, where Ckn−1
stands for combinations of n− 1 taken k. Recall that
xz4p5= 1 − Fz4p5.
Along the equilibrium path, if firm i uses frame A
and charges price p, its profit is
4A1p5 = pn−1xA4p5n−1
+p
n−2∑
k=0
P kn−1xA4p5
k
[
2n−k−1 +41−251
]
0 (11)
If k other firms also use frame A, firm i has a pos-
itive demand only if all other A firms price higher
than p. This happens with probability xA4p5k. Condi-
tional on that, if there are no B firms in the market
(if k = n − 1), then firm i serves the whole market.
The first term in 4A1p5 follows from this. Otherwise,
firm i’s demand depends on whether the consumer
can compare the B firms’ offers. If she is confused by
frame complexity and unable to compare (which hap-
pens with probability 2), all B firms are undominated
(since no comparison between A and B is possible),
so firm i’s demand is n−k−1. If she is not confused by
frame complexity and, therefore, can compare prices
in frame B (this happens with probability 1−2), only
one B firm is undominated, so firm i’s demand is 1.
If instead, along the equilibrium path, firm i uses B
and charges price p, its profit is
4B1p5 = p41 −5n−1
[
2
n
+ 41 −25xB4p5n−1
]
+ p
n−1∑
k=1
P kn−1
[
2
1 −n−k
n− k
+ 41 −2541 −15xB4p5n−k−1
]
0 (12)
The first term gives the expected profit when there are
no A firms in the market: the consumers who are con-
fused by frame complexity purchase randomly among
all B firms, whereas those who are not confused buy
from firm i only if it offers the lowest price. When
k ≥ 1 firms use frame A (note that only one of them
will be undominated), if the consumer is confused
by frame complexity (i.e., unable to compare prices
in frame B), all B firms are undominated and have
demand 1 − n−k in total. Firm i shares equally this
residual demand with the other B firms. If the con-
sumer is not confused by frame complexity, to face a
positive demand, firm i must charge the lowest price
in group B (this happens with probability xB4p5n−k−1),
in which case it gets the residual demand 1 −1.
Note that for 1 = 1 price competition can only
take place among firms that use the same frame,
so xA4p5 does not appear in 4B1p5 and xB4p5 does
not appear in 4A1p5. This also implies that both
profit functions are valid even if firm i charges an
off-equilibrium price. Thus, the upper bounds of the
price cdf’s are frame-independent: pA1 = pB1 = 1. Oth-
erwise any price greater than pz1 would lead to a
higher profit. Then the frame-indifference condition
4A115 = 4B115 pins down a unique well-defined
 ∈ 40115 (see Equation (B1) in Appendix B.1). Each
firm’s equilibrium profit is
 =4A115= 41 −5n−1[2n−1 + 41 −251]0 (13)
The price distributions FA and FB are implicitly
determined by 4z1p5 =  since any price in the
support of Fz should lead to the same profit in
a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Both Fz are uniquely
defined. The boundary prices pz0 < 1 are determined
by 4z1pz05=. Deviations to prices lower than pz0 are
not profitable because they only result in a price loss
and no demand increase. We characterize the sym-
metric equilibrium below.
Proposition 3. For n≥ 2 and 2 < 1 = 1, there is a
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each firm
adopts frame A with probability  and frame B with prob-
ability 1−. When a firm uses frame z ∈ 8A1B9, it chooses
its price randomly according to a cdf Fz defined on 6p
z
0117
and implicitly determined by 4z1p5 =  with 4z1p5
given in (11) and (12) and  given in (13).
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium price distributions
FA4p5 (the solid line) and FB4p5 (the dashed line) in the
case with n= 3, 1 = 1, 2 = 005, and k = 1/41 + k5.
Recall that in the duopoly equilibrium in Propo-
sition 1 pricing is frame independent (i.e., FA4p5 =
FB4p5) if confused consumers have no exogenous bias
toward a specific frame. However, this is no longer
Figure 1 Price Distributions with n = 3, 1 = 1, and 2 = 005
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0.0
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true in the case with more than two firms, as the
above example indicates. (See the online supplemen-
tary document for a rigorous treatment of this issue.)
When FA 6= FB, there is no straightforward way to
analytically rank the prices associated with the two
frames.
3.1.2. The Impact of Greater Competition. We
now study the impact of an increase in the number
of firms on the equilibrium framing strategies and on
profits and consumer surplus. Our analysis is based
on the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3. We
first consider a market with many sellers, which pro-
vides the key insight for our main result.
Proposition 4. When there are a large number of firms
in the market,
lim
n→=
{
1/2 if 2 =01
0 if 2>03
lim
n→n=
{
0 if 2 =01
>0 if 2>00
When frame B is also a simple frame different
from A (i.e., when 2 = 0), the only way to reduce
price competition is by frame differentiation. This is
why in a sufficiently competitive market  tends to
1/2, which maximizes frame differentiation. However,
the ability of frame differentiation alone to weaken
price competition is limited. In fragmented markets,
each frame is adopted by more than one firm almost
surely (as long as  is bounded away from zero and
one), so price competition becomes extremely intense
and the market price tends to marginal cost.
When frame B is complex (i.e., when 2 > 0),
the impact of greater competition on firms’ framing
strategies changes completely. In a sufficiently com-
petitive market, firms use frame B almost surely: they
rely on frame complexity to soften price competition.
(This is true even if frame B is only slightly more com-
plex than is frame A.) The reason is that in a large
market, the role of frame differentiation in reducing
price competition becomes negligible, but the effect of
frame complexity is still significant. For example, if
all firms employ frame B for sure, industry profit is
always 2, regardless of the number of firms in the
market. Hence, when frame B is complex, competi-
tion does not drive the market price to marginal cost.
Recall that our oligopoly model allows consumers
to have a bias toward the simple frame when fac-
ing both simple and complex frames. Note that our
results hold even if some (but not all) confused con-
sumers favor the simple frame. More precisely, they
hold for any k ∈ 41/41+k5115, where k captures the
likelihood that a confused consumer buys from the
frame A firm when there are other k undominated
frame B firms to choose from.21
21 We previously assumed that k weakly decreases with k. But,
arguably, consumers might opt for the simple frame more often
Figure 2 Industry Profit and n for 1 = 1 and 2 = 009
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The analysis for large n suggests that when the
number of firms increases, frame B’s complexity
becomes a more important anticompetitive device. In
effect, as we show below,  tends to decrease in the
number of firms. That is, greater competition tends
to induce firms to use the complex frame more fre-
quently. Is it then possible that in the presence of a
complex frame B, greater competition raises market
prices by increasing market complexity? The answer,
in general, depends on the parameter values. But
at least for sufficiently large 2, greater competition
can actually increase industry profit and harm con-
sumers. Therefore, in the market with price fram-
ing, competition policy that focuses exclusively on
an increase in the number of competitors might have
undesired effects. For tractability, we focus on the uni-
formly random purchase rule k = 1/41 + k5.
Proposition 5. With 0<2 <1 = 1 and the random
purchase rule k = 1/41 + k5,
(i) when n increases from 2 to 3, both  and industry
profit n decrease;
(ii) for any n ≥ 3, there exists ˆ ∈ 40115 such that for
2 > ˆ,  decreases, but industry profit n increases from
n to n+ 1.
Beyond the limit results, numerical simulations
suggest that  tends to decrease in n, and indus-
try profit can increase in n for a relatively large 2.
Figure 2 shows how industry profit varies with n
when 2 = 009.
3.1.3. The Case with 2 < 1 < 1. Price competi-
tion can now take place between firms using different
frames. Then both xA4p5 and xB4p5 appear in the profit
functions 4z1p5. The more involved related analysis
is presented in the online supplementary document.
We show there that if a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium exists, then it still satisfies pA1 = pB1 = 1.
when they face more options, which would imply that k increases
with k. In effect, as we discuss in the proof of Proposition 4, our
results still hold in that case as long as limn→ n−1 < 1 (i.e., if even
in the limit, not all consumers favor the simple frame).
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Numerical simulations suggest that greater competi-
tion can still have undesired effects when 1 is large
and 2 is close to 1. For example, when 1 = 0098
and 2 = 009, industry profit varies with n in a way
similar to Figure 2.
3.2. Frame Complexity Is More Confusing Than
Frame Differentiation 42 >15
Consider the case where consumers are more likely to
be confused by frame complexity than by frame dif-
ferentiation (i.e., 2 > 1). We first analyze the polar
case in which prices in frame B are always incompa-
rable (2 = 1) and then discuss the robustness of our
main results to the case with 2 < 1. Like before, there
is no pure-strategy equilibrium (see the online sup-
plementary document for details). Below, we report
the main results and relegate the technical analysis to
Appendix B.2.
Proposition 6. For n ≥ 2 and 0 < 1 < 2 = 1, there
is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each
firm adopts frame A with probability  and frame B with
probability 1−. When a firm uses frame A, it chooses its
price randomly according to a cdf FA defined on 6p
A
0 115;
when it uses frame B, it charges price p= 1 for sure.
Using the equilibrium in Proposition 6, we analyze
the impact of greater competition on the market out-
come. When there are many sellers in the market, the
results for 2 > 0 in Proposition 4 still hold. That is,
limn→  = 0 and limn→ n > 0. The same intuition
applies: in a sufficiently competitive market, the abil-
ity of frame differentiation to soften price competi-
tion is negligible, so firms resort to the complexity of
frame B.
The following result shows that in the current case
greater competition can also improve industry profit
and decrease consumer surplus. In particular, this
must happen when 1 is small. The reason is that for
a small 1, the complexity of frame B is more effec-
tive in reducing price competition, which makes the
frequency of using frame B increase fast enough with
the number of firms. The resulting market complex-
ity could then dominate the usual competitive effect
of larger n. Figure 3 illustrates how industry profit
varies with n when 1 = 0005.22
Proposition 7. In the case with 0 < 1 < 2 = 1, for
any n ≥ 2, there exists ˆ ∈ 40115 such that for 1 < ˆ,
 decreases while industry profit n increases from n to
n+ 1.
3.2.1. The Case with 1 < 2 < 1. A symmetric
separating equilibrium with SA = 6pA0 1 pˆ7 and SB =
6pˆ1 pB1 7, resembling the one in Proposition 6, still
22 For industry profit to increase at a larger n, 1 needs to be smaller.
But this is always feasible according to Proposition 7.
Figure 3 Industry Profit and n for 1 = 0005 and 2 = 1
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exists under some parameter restrictions (when 1
is not too close to 2 < 1). Also, for fixed 2 < 1, if
1 is sufficiently small, greater competition can still
increase industry profit and harm consumers. The
more involved analysis of this case is presented in the
online supplementary document.
4. Discussion
Comparison with the default-bias choice rule in Piccione
and Spiegler (2012). The dominance-based choice
rule embeds a simultaneous assessment of competing
offers, and a consumer’s final choice is not affected by
the sequence of pairwise comparisons. This “simul-
taneous search” feature is suitable in markets where
the consumers are not influenced by past experiences
(or are newcomers). Piccione and Spiegler (2012) con-
sider a default-bias model where consumers are ini-
tially randomly attached to one brand (the default
option), and they switch to another brand only if
it is comparable to and better than their default.
There, with sequential comparisons, a consumer’s
final choice depends on her default option.
In duopoly, the default-bias model is equivalent
to the simultaneous assessment one (with the ran-
dom purchase rule for confused consumers). This is
because if the two firms’ offers are comparable, in
both models the better one attracts all consumers,
whereas if they are incomparable, in both models
the firms share the market equally. But with more
than two firms, the two models diverge. In this case,
the default-bias model calls for further structure on
the choice rule. To see why, consider the following
example.
Example 4. There are three firms in the market. Let
2 = 1 and 1 = 0 (the only confusion source is frame
complexity). Firm 1 adopts frame A and prices at p1,
whereas firms 2 and 3 adopt frame B and price at p2
and p3, respectively, with p2 < p1 < p3.
The dominance-based rule implies that consumers
purchase only from firm 2 because firm 3 is domi-
nated by firm 1 and firm 1 is dominated by firm 2.
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Now consider the default-bias model. A consumer
initially attached to firm 2 does not switch. If she is
initially attached to firm 1, she switches to firm 2.
However, if she is initially attached to firm 3, she
switches to firm 1, but whether she further switches to
firm 2 depends on what the choice rule of the default-
biased consumer dictates. The rule should specify if
the consumer assesses firm 2’s offer using her default
option (i.e., firm 3) or using her new choice (i.e.,
firm 2). By contrast, the dominance-based rule applies
regardless of the number of firms in the market.23
A default bias adds another type of bounded ratio-
nality to confusion caused by framing. In this sense,
our framework is a minimal deviation from the ratio-
nal benchmark.
Noisy price comparisons. Our framework is a
tractable way to capture the idea that confusion in
price comparisons reduces consumers’ price sensitiv-
ity. In particular, 1 can be regarded as a measure of
price elasticity reduction when consumers face prices
in two different frames, and 2 can be regarded as a
measure of price elasticity reduction when consumers
face two offers in frame B. An alternative (but less
tractable) way to model the framing effect is to intro-
duce noisy price comparisons. If firm i adopts the
simple frame A, consumers understand its price pi
perfectly. Instead, if it adopts a complex frame B,
consumers perceive its price as pi + i. This allows
consumer choices to depend on the price difference
between two products even when consumers get con-
fused. In this alternative model, if both i and j have
a symmetric distribution around zero, it can be shown
that in the symmetric equilibrium the firms still ran-
domize on both frames and prices (see the online
supplementary document for details). However, it is
not possible to fully characterize the equilibrium.
Both cases 1 > 2 and 1 < 2 can be justified in
this setting with noisy price comparisons. To illus-
trate, suppose i is a random variable with the stan-
dard normal distribution ê. When both firm i and
firm j use frame B, suppose 4i1j5 follow a joint nor-
mal distribution with correlation coefficient  ∈ 60117.
Then i − j follows a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance 241 −5.
When both firms adopt frame A, demand is per-
fectly elastic at pi = pj . When only one firm, say, firm i,
adopts frame B, its demand function is
Qi = Pr4pi + i < pj5=ê4pj − pi50
23 The fact that these two choice rules may lead to different out-
comes can also be seen from the following example: consider the
frame choices in Example 4, but let 2 = 0, 1 = 1, and p1 < p2 < p3.
Our approach (with the uniform purchase rule) predicts that firms
1 and 2 will share the market equally, whereas the default-bias rule
predicts that firm 1 has demand 1/3 and firm 2 has demand 2/3.
Thus, demand elasticity at pi = pj is
2pi4051 (14)
where 4 · 5 is the standard normal density. When
both firms adopt frame B, firm i’s demand function is
Qi = Pr4pi + i < pj + j5=ê
(
pj − pi√
241 −5
)
1
so demand elasticity at pi = pj is
2pi
405√
241 −5 0 (15)
If  < 1/2 (e.g., if i is independent of j ), (15) is less
than (14), so the demand is less elastic when both
firms adopt frame B than when only one firm does
so. This corresponds to the case of 1 < 2. In con-
trast, if > 1/2, the opposite is true. This corresponds
to the case of 1 > 2. In particular, when the two
error terms i and j are perfectly correlated, frame B
can be regarded as a simple frame and we return
to the case with perfectly elastic demand. The corre-
lation between i and j might be affected by how
frame similarity influences consumer misperception.
If a consumer misperceives two prices in frame B in
a similar way (e.g., underestimates them to a similar
extent), then the correlation between i and j should
be high.
Costly information processing as an alternative inter-
pretation. Our model assumes that there are bound-
edly rational consumers who are unable to compare
framed prices or understand the market equilibrium.
But it can also be interpreted as a model with rational
consumers and costly information processing. Price
comparisons in the presence of framing might require
costly information processing, and consumers may
differ in their costs. As a result, some consumers who
have high information processing costs will opt out of
doing so and just behave as the confused consumers
do in our model.24
However, an interpretation with rational consumers
might be inconsistent with the separating equilib-
rium in Proposition 2 (where the complex frame is
always associated with higher prices than the sim-
ple one). Rational consumers should be able to infer
prices from frames and always choose the simple-
frame product. (In this sense, our assumption that
24 Price framing reduces the comparability of competing offers and
increases consumers’ search/evaluation costs. In a related vein,
Kuksov (2004) presents a consumer search model where firms pro-
duce more differentiated products in response to lower search costs.
As a result, lower search costs may lead to higher prices in the mar-
ket. In Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010), firms’ range of alternatives
affects consumers’ search/evaluation costs, and too many alterna-
tives may induce consumers to leave the market without making
a choice.
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consumers weakly favor the simple frame partially
reflects such sophistication.) In this case, the sepa-
rating equilibrium would not be valid. (This is not
an issue in our model with boundedly rational con-
sumers.) Nevertheless, notice that the separating equi-
librium could still make sense if there is always a
nontrivial mass of naive consumers who do not try to
understand market equilibrium.
Carlin (2009) considers a setting related to our case
with 2 >1. In his model, if a consumer incurs a cost,
she can learn all prices in the market, thereby pur-
chasing the cheapest product; otherwise, she remains
uninformed and shops randomly. In equilibrium,
higher complexity is associated with higher prices.
Consumers in Carlin’s model cannot infer prices from
a firm’s price complexity level because they cannot
observe individual firms’ complexities; they can only
observe the aggregate market complexity.
Dependence between the two sources of confusion. Our
oligopoly model in §3 assumes that confusion due
to frame differentiation and confusion due to frame
complexity are independent, and it considers up to
four types of consumer groups whose sizes are deter-
mined by the parameters 1 and 2. However, the
two sources of confusion may be related. Take, for
instance, our numeracy-skill example for 1 > 2
in §2.1. There, confusion stems from poor numeracy
skills and it is mitigated by similarity, so if a consumer
is confused by two complex frames, she must also be
confused by two different frames.
To allow for dependence between the two sources
of confusion, we can regard the four consumer groups
as the primitives of the model. A fraction FD of con-
sumers are confused only by frame differentiation, a
fraction FC of consumers are confused only by frame
complexity, a fraction B of consumers are confused
by either source, and the remaining fraction 1−FD −
FC −B of consumers are fully aware. (Note that the
two confusion sources are independent if and only
if FD = 141 − 25, FC = 241 − 15 and B = 12.)
Then, our analysis carries over with some change
of notation. (The analysis in the duopoly example
also remains unchanged as long as we replace 1
by FD + B and 2 by FC + B.) In particular, the
case with 1 = 1>2 analyzed in §3.1 corresponds to
FD = 1 −2 and B = 2, and the case with 2 = 1 >
1 analyzed in §3.2 corresponds to FC = 1 − 1 and
B = 1. In these two polar cases, (in)dependence of
the two confusion sources actually does not play a
role.
More frames. For simplicity, this study has focused
on the case with only two frames. But it would
be interesting to investigate how introducing more
frames affects competition and market performance.
An oligopoly model with a general frame structure is
not tractable, in general. In the online supplementary
document, we explore two tractable cases and show
that the impact of a greater number of frames
depends on the frame structure. In particular, when
there exist both simple and complex frames, greater
frame variety may induce lower market prices and so
benefit consumers.
In the first case, there are m ≥ 2 simple frames
8A11 0 0 0 1Am9 and n firms. We assume that (i) con-
sumers can perfectly compare prices in the same
frame, but are totally confused between different
frames, and (ii) consumers use the dominance-based
choice rule with the uniformly random purchase rule
among undominated firms. (This is a generalization
of the two-frame case with 0 = 2 = 0 and 1 = 1.)
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, numerical simu-
lations suggest that industry profit decreases with n
and increases with m. Intuitively, when there are more
firms in the market, it becomes more difficult for each
firm to differentiate itself from its rivals (and, in this
variant of the model, all available frames are simple
and so firms cannot rely on frame complexity). How-
ever, when there are more frames available, firms can
frame differentiate and avoid price competition more
easily. In addition, if m = n and both increase (e.g.,
this would be the case if each new entrant brings a
new frame to the market), industry profit goes up
(but is bounded from above). This suggests that the
frame differentiation effect is stronger than the com-
petition effect.
In the second case, we consider the duopoly
scenario with two simple frames 8A11A29 and one
complex frame B. We assume that a fraction 1 of con-
sumers get confused if they see 4Aj1B5 for j = 112;
a fraction 2 of consumers get confused if they see
4B1B5; and a fraction <112 of consumers get con-
fused if they see 4A11A25. We show that compared to
the case with only one simple frame and one complex
frame, firms now use simple frames more often. That
is, the availability of more simple frames induces firms
to rely more on frame differentiation. If frame differen-
tiation is less confusing than frame complexity (i.e., if
1 <2), market prices will become lower: An increase
in the number of (simple) frames lowers industry prof-
its and improves consumer surplus. If frame differen-
tiation is more confusing than frame complexity (i.e.,
if 1 >2), the opposite is true.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of competition in both
prices and price frames. In a homogeneous product
market, price framing can obstruct consumers’ abil-
ity to compare prices and create confusion. Our study
shows that in the symmetric equilibrium, firms ran-
domize on both price frames and prices and make
positive profits. An increase in the number of firms
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reduces firms’ ability to frame differentiate and makes
them use complex frames more often. As a result,
greater competition might increase profits and harm
consumers. In our setting, consumer confusion may
stem from price format incompatibility or price com-
plexity. The nature of the equilibrium depends on
which source of consumer confusion leads to more
confused consumers.
This study is motivated by price framing, but it also
applies to situations where product framing reduces
the comparability of offers. For instance, the way of
presenting nutritional information might frame iden-
tical food products differently. An “improved recipe”
or a “British meal” label might spuriously differen-
tiate a ready meal from its close substitutes.25 Pack-
age size differences or quantity premia could also
make it harder to compare products. On the same
supermarket shelf toothpastes come in tubes of 50, 75,
or 100 ml, and refreshments, cleaning products, tea
boxes occasionally come in larger—“extra 25% free”—
containers. This interpretation also relates our paper
to the literature on endogenous product differentia-
tion (see, for instance, in Tirole 1988, Chap. 7). A main
difference is that in our model firms make product
differentiation and price choices simultaneously.
Our model predicts that firms randomize their
frame choices in order to obstruct consumer price
comparisons and sustain higher profits. But this pre-
diction does not take into account several factors that
may weaken firms’ incentive to obfuscate consumers.
First, in some markets changing frames frequently
could be costly and, as a result, firms may refrain
from mixing on price frames. Second, price fram-
ing and the resulting market complexity may induce
some consumers to drop out of the market.26 Third,
ex post some consumers may be able to discover that
they were misled by a firm’s price framing strategy,
so they may avoid this firm in the future. This repu-
tation concern would also reduce firms’ incentive to
frame prices.
Finally, in financial, energy, or mortgage markets,
among others, information intermediaries could help
consumers compare offers and identify the best deals.
Their presence should mitigate the confusion caused
25 The reportage “What’s Really in Our Food?” broadcast on BBC
One in July 2009 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00lrjk4).
stressed this point. Interviewed customers admitted to being misled
by a ready food made with imported meat and labeled as “British
meal.” Also, buyers seem to have a poor understanding of what
labels such as “free range” really mean.
26 Market complexity often increases consumer search costs, so a
consumer search model without the assumption of full market cov-
erage can capture this effect. For example, Janssen et al. (2005) show
in the framework of Stahl (1989) that if the first price quote is also
costly, then when search costs become too high consumers start to
drop out of the market, and thus industry profits fall.
by price framing and thus reduce firms’ incentives to
frame their prices. However, in spite of this, consumer
confusion seems to persist in these environments.
There might be several reasons why information
intermediaries do not completely solve the issue
of price framing and consumer confusion. On the
demand side, take-up of such services is not univer-
sal. Consumers differ in their opportunity costs of
time or search methods and they may rationally opt
out of using such services. They may also overesti-
mate their ability to make accurate comparisons with-
out specialized help. In some markets where the best
tariff choice depends on individual characteristics,
consumers might be reluctant to share the relevant
information with intermediaries because of privacy
concerns. On the supply side, information interme-
diaries have incentives to strategically limit sellers’
participation to such platforms (e.g., by charging high
participation fees) in order to protect their informa-
tional value and ability to extract rents.
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Appendix A. Proofs in the Duopoly Case
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that FA has a mass point at
some price p ∈ SA in the symmetric equilibrium. The equi-
librium condition requires that 4A1p5 generates the same
profit as do other frame and price combinations. Given the
mass point, in the symmetric equilibrium there is a posi-
tive probability that both firms use frame A and tie at p.
In that event, because all consumers are price aware, reduc-
ing price slightly can increase demand discontinuously. This
implies that a unilateral deviation to 4A1p − 5 (for a suf-
ficiently small  > 0) generates a higher profit than does
4A1p5, which leads to a contradiction.
A similar argument works for frame B. Suppose that FB
has a mass point at some price p ∈ SB in the symmetric
equilibrium. The equilibrium condition requires that 4B1p5
generates the same profit as other frame and price combina-
tions. Given the mass point, in the symmetric equilibrium
there is a positive probability that both firms use frame B
and tie at p. In that event, because some consumers are
price aware when 2 < 1, reducing the price slightly can
increase demand discontinuously. This implies that a uni-
lateral deviation to 4B1p− 5 (for a sufficiently small  > 0)
generates a higher profit than 4B1p5, which also leads to a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1. The proposed configuration
is indeed an equilibrium since no deviation to p < p0 is
profitable. We show now that it is the unique symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium with Fz strictly increasing on its
support. Recall that, by Lemma 3, when 2 < 1, in any sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium Fz is continuous on Sz.
The proof entails several steps.
Step 1: SA ∩ SB 6= . Suppose pA1 < pB0 . Then if a firm uses
frame A and charges pA1 , its profit is
4A1pA1 5= pA1 41 −5641 −15+1/270
The firm has positive demand only if the rival uses frame B,
in which case it sells to all price aware consumers and to
half of the confused ones. Clearly, this firm can do better
by charging a price slightly higher than pA1 . A contradiction.
Similarly, we can rule out the possibility of pB1 < p
A
0 .
Step 2: max8pA1 1 p
B
1 9 = 1. Suppose pz1 = max8pA1 1 pB1 9 < 1.
Then, pz1 is dominated by p
z
1 +  (for some small > 05.
Step 3: SA = SB = 6p0117. Suppose pA1 < pB1 = 1. Then, along
the equilibrium path, if firm i uses frame A and charges
p ∈ 6pA1 117, its profit is
4A1p5= p41 −5641 −15xB4p5+1/271
since it faces a positive demand only if firm j uses frame B.
If firm i uses frame B and charges the same price p, its
profit is
4B1p5= p{1/2 + 41 −5641 −25xB4p5+2/27}1
that should be equal to the candidate equilibrium profit.
Because the supposition that pA1 < p
B
1 = 1 and Step 1 imply
that pA1 ∈ SB , the indifference condition requires 4A1pA1 5=
4B1pA1 5 or
41 −541 −25−1 = 241 −541 −25xB4pA1 50
But if this equation holds, 4A1p5 > 4B1p5 for p ∈ 4pA1 117
as 1 > 2 and xB is strictly decreasing on SB . A contradic-
tion. Similarly, we can exclude the possibility of pB1 < p
A
1 = 1.
Hence, it must be that pA1 = pB1 = 1.
Then, from 4A115=4B115, it follows that
1 = 41 −541 −250 (A1)
Now suppose pA0 < p
B
0 . Then
4A1pB0 5= pB0 6xA4pB0 5+ 41 −541 −1/257 and
4B1pB0 5= pB0
{
641 −15xA4pB0 5+1/27+ 41 −541 −2/25
}
0
Since the supposition pA0 < p
B
0 and Step 1 imply that p
B
0 ∈ SA,
we need 4A1pB0 5=4B1pB0 5, or
2xA4p
B
0 5= 1 +
1 −

1 −2
1
0
The left-hand side is strictly lower than 2 given that xA is
strictly decreasing on SA and pA0 < p
B
0 . But (A1) implies that
the right-hand side is equal to 2. A contradiction. Similarly,
we can exclude the possibility of pA0 < p
B
0 . Hence, it must be
that pA0 = pB0 .
Step 4: FA = FB . For any p ∈ 6p0117, the indifference condi-
tion requires 4A1p5=4B1p5. Using (2) and (3), we get
16xA4p5− 1/27= 41 −541 −256xB4p5− 1/27
for all p ∈ 6p0117. Then (A1) implies xA = xB (or FA = FB).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. (1) Let us first prove the result
for 2 < 1.
(1.1) A deviation to 4A1p < pA0 5 is obviously not prof-
itable. A deviation to 4A1p > pˆ5 generates a profit equal to
p41 −5641 −15xB4p5+1/270
Using (7), one can check that the deviation profit is lower
than 4B1p5 in (3) with xA4p5 = 0. The last possible devia-
tion is 4B1p < pˆ5 that results in a profit equal to
p8641 −15xA4p5+1/27+ 41 −541 −2/2590
Again, using (7), one can check that the deviation profit is
lower than 4A1p5 in (2) with xB4p5= 1.
(1.2) We now prove uniqueness. As in the proof
of Proposition 1, we can show that SA ∩ SB 6=  and
max8pA1 1 p
B
1 9 = 1. Then the two steps below complete
the proof.
Step 1: SA ∩ SB = 8pˆ9 for some pˆ. Suppose to the contrary
that SA ∩ SB = 6p′1 p′′7 with p′ < p′′. Then for any p ∈ 6p′1 p′′7,
it must be that 4A1p5 = 4B1p5, where the profit func-
tions are given by (2) and (3). This indifference condition
requires that
16xA4p5− 1/27= 41 −541 −256xB4p5− 1/27
for all p ∈ 6p′1 p′′7. Since 1 < 2 and Fz is strictly increas-
ing on Sz, the left-hand side is a decreasing function of
p1 whereas the right-hand side is an increasing function
of p. So the condition cannot hold for all p ∈ 6p′1 p′′7.
A contradiction.
Step 2: pB1 = 1. Suppose pB1 < 1. Then Step 1 and
max8pA1 1 p
B
1 9= 1 imply that pA1 = 1 and pB1 = pA0 = pˆ < 1. Then
each firm’s equilibrium profit should be equal to 4A115=
41−51/2 since the prices associated with B are lower than
one. But if a firm chooses frame B and p = 1, its profit is
61 + 41 − 527/2 because it sells to half of the confused
consumers. This deviation profit is greater than 4A115
given that 2 >1. A contradiction.
Therefore, in equilibrium, it must be that SA = 6pA0 1 pˆ7 and
SB = 6pˆ117.
(2) The equilibrium when 2 = 1 is just the limit of the
equilibrium in (1) as 2 → 1. But now SA = 6pA0 115 and
SB = 819. Q.E.D.
Appendix B. Proofs in the Oligopoly Model
B.1. The Case with 2 <1 = 1
Equilibrium Condition for  When 0 < 2 < 1 = 1.
Since the price distributions for frames A and B share
the same upper bound p = 1, letting p = 1 in (11) and
(12) yields a frame indifference condition 4A115=4B115.
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By dividing each side by 41 − 5n−1 and rearranging the
equation, we obtain
2
(
n−1 −
1
n
)
+41−251
=2
n−2∑
k=1
Ckn−141−n−k5
n−k
(

1−
)k
+41−15
(

1−
)n−1
0 (B1)
The right-hand side of (B1) increases in  ∈ 60117 from zero
to infinity, and the left-hand side is positive for any 2 ∈
40115 as n−1 ≥ 1/n. Hence, (B1) has a unique solution  in
40115 as we claimed in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 4. When frame B is also a simple
frame (i.e., when 2 = 0), the equilibrium condition (B1) for
 becomes

1 − =
(
1
1 −1
)1/4n−15
0
It follows that  tends to 1/2 as n→ . Then industry profit
n = n141 −5n−1 must converge to zero.27
Now consider 2 > 0. Since the left-hand side of (B1)
is bounded, it must be that limn→  ≤ 1/2 (otherwise, the
right-hand side would tend to infinity). Since 8k9n−1k=1 is
a nonincreasing sequence, the right-hand side of (B1) is
greater than
241 −15
n
n−2∑
k=1
Ckn−1
(

1 −
)k
= 241 −15
n
[
1 −n−1
41 −5n−1 − 1
]
0
So it must be that limn→ n41 − 5n−1 > 0; otherwise,
the right-hand side of (B1) tends to infinity (given that
limn→  ≤ 1/2 and so limn→41 − n−15 = 1). This result
implies that  must converge to zero and industry profit
n = n41 − 5n−162n−1 + 41 − 2517 must be bounded
away from zero as n→ .28 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that with the random
purchase rule k = 1/41 + k5, (B1) becomes
1 −2 = 22
n−2∑
k=1
Ckn−1
n− k+ 1
(

1 −
)k
+
(

1 −
)n−1
1 (B2)
and industry profit is
n = n41 −5n−1
(
2
n
+ 1 −2
2
)
0 (B3)
(i) For n = 2, we have  = 41 −25/41 + 41 −255; for
n= 3, we have  = x/41 + x5 with x =
√
422/9 + 1 −2 −
22/3. The latter is smaller if x < 1−2, which can be easily
verified given that 2 < 1. The industry profit result follows
from straightforward algebra calculation by using (B3).
27 However, industry profit n can rise with n when n is small and
1 takes relatively extreme values. For example, when 1 = 0095 or
0005, from n = 2 to 3, industry profit n increases from 00095 to
about 00099.
28 If k increases with k, then we can replace 1 in the above dis-
played equation by n−1. Hence, if limn→ n−1 < 1, our argument
still works.
(ii) Consider the limit case 2 → 1. The equilibrium con-
dition (B2) implies that  should then tend to zero. Since
≈ 0, then /41 −5≈ +2. For n≥ 4, the right-hand side
of (B2) can be approximated as
22
[
n− 1
n
4+25+ n− 2
2
4+252
]
(B4)
by discarding all higher-order terms. (For n = 3, the right-
hand side of (B2) is approximately 44/3524 + 25 +
4+252. One can check that the approximation result below
still applies.)
Let 2 = 1 −  with ≈ 0, and use the second-order (lin-
ear) approximation  ≈ k1 + k22. Substituting them into
(B4) and discarding all terms of order higher than 2, we
obtain
24n− 15
n
k1+
(
24n− 15
n
4k2 − k15+
n2 − 2
n
k21
)
20
Because the left-hand side of (B2) is , we can solve
k1 =
n
24n− 15 1 k2 = k1 −
n2 − 2
24n− 15 k
2
10
Since k1 decreases with n,  must decrease with n.
Since ≈ 0 (so that ≈ 0), industry profit (for n≥ 3) can
be approximated as
n = 41 −5n−1
[
1 +
(
n
2
− 1
)

]
≈ 61 − 4n− 15+C2n−127
[
1 +
(
n
2
− 1
)

]
≈ 1 − + 4n− 25n
2
84n− 152 
20
The second step follows from discarding all terms of order
higher than 2, and the third step comes from substitut-
ing ≈ k1+ k22 and discarding all terms of order higher
than 2. It is easy to see that the approximated industry
profit increases with n. (Note that the first-order approxi-
mation of  is not sufficient to tell how n varies with n.)
Q.E.D.
B.2. The Case with 1 <2 = 1
We first characterize a symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium 41 FA1 FB5, where  is the probability of using frame A,
FA is defined on SA = 6pA0 115 and is atomless, and FB is
degenerate on SB = 819.
Along the equilibrium path, if firm i uses frame A and
charges p ∈ 4pA0 115, its profit is given by
4A1p5= p
n−1∑
k=0
P kn−1xA4p5
k41n−k−1 + 1 −150
This expression follows because when k other firms also
use frame A, firm i has a positive demand only if all other
A firms charge prices higher than p. Conditional on that,
with probability 1, the consumer is confused by frame dif-
ferentiation and buys from firm i with probability n−k−1
(since all n−k−1 firms which use B are undominated); with
probability 1 −1, the consumer can compare A and B and,
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because all B firms charge price pB = 1> p and consequently
are dominated, she only buys from firm i.
A firm’s equilibrium profit is equal to
 = lim
p→1
4A1p5= 41 −5n−141n−1 + 1 −150
Then the expression for FA4p5 follows from 4A1p5=, and
pA0 satisfies 4A1p
A
0 5=. Both of them are well defined.
If firm i uses B and charges p= 1, then its profit is
4B115= 41 −5
n−1
n
+1
n−1∑
k=1
P kn−1
1 −n−k
n− k 0
Notice that firm i has a positive demand only if all other
firms also use frame B or there are A firms but the consumer
is unable to compare prices in different frames.
The equilibrium condition 4B115 = limp→1 4A1p5 pins
down a well-defined :
1 − 1/n
1
+n−1 − 1 =
n−1∑
k=1
Ckn−141 −n−k5
n− k
(

1 −
)k
0 (B5)
The left-hand side of (B5) is positive given that n−1 ≥ 1/n,
and the right-hand side is increasing in  from zero to infin-
ity. Hence, for any given n≥ 2 and 1 ∈ 40115, Equation (B5)
has a unique solution  in 40115.
To complete the proof of Proposition 6, we only need to
rule out profitable deviations from the proposed equilib-
rium. First, consider two possible deviations with frame A:
(i) a deviation to 4A1p < pA0 5 is not profitable because the
firm does not gain market share, but loses on prices; (ii) a
deviation 4A1p = 15 is not profitable either since the devia-
tor’s profit is 41 −5n−1n−1 <.
Let us now consider a deviation to 4B1p ∈ 4pA0 1155. The
deviator’s profit is
ˆ4B1p5= p4B115+ p41 −15
n−1∑
k=1
P kn−1xA4p5
k0
This expression captures the fact that when n−1 other firms
also use B, or when k ≥ 1 firms use A and the consumer
is confused between A and B, firm i’s demand does not
depend on its price so that it is equal to 4B115. When k≥ 1
firms use A and the consumer is not confused between A
and B, all other B firms (which charge price p= 1) are dom-
inated by the cheapest A firm, and the consumer buys from
firm i only if the cheapest A firm charges a price greater
than p. Notice that from 4A1p5= for p ∈ 4pA0 115, the sec-
ond term in ˆ4B1p5 is equal to
 − p − p1
n−1∑
k=1
P kn−1xA4p5
kn−k−10
Then, ˆ4B1p5 < p +  − p = . The deviation to
4B1p < pA0 5 will result in a lower profit. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. From (B5), it follows that → 1
as 1 → 0. Let 1 =  with ≈ 0, and = 1 −  with ≈ 0.
Then the right-hand side of (B5) can be approximated as
41 −15
(
1 − 

)n−1
≈ 1 −1
n−1
since only the term with k = n − 1 matters when  ≈ 0.
Hence, from (B5), we can solve
≈
(
1−1
41/541−1/n5+n−1 −1
)1/4n−15
≈
(
n41−15
n−1
)1/4n−15
0
The second step follows because n−1 −1 is negligible com-
pared to 41/541 − 1/n5. Given that  ≈ 0, it is not difficult
to see that  increases with n (e.g., one can show that ln
increases with n). Hence,  decreases with n. Since  ≈ 0,
industry profit is
n = nn−161 + 4n−1 − 157≈
n241 −15
n− 1
by discarding the term of 2. Clearly, n increases
with n. Q.E.D.
References
Baye M, Morgan J, Scholten P (2006) Information, search, and price
dispersion. Hendershott T, ed. Handbook of Economics and Infor-
mation Systems, Vol. 1, Chap. 6 (Elsevier Press, Amsterdam),
323–376.
BBC News (2009) Call for airline charges clean-up. (July 17), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8156085.stm.
BBC News (2012) Energy bills: Ofgem sets plans for simpler tariffs.
(October 19), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20001111.
Brown J, Hossain T, Morgan J (2010) Shrouded attributes and infor-
mation suppression: Evidence from the field. Quart. J. Econom.
125(2):859–876.
Carlin B (2009) Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets.
J. Financial Econom. 91(3):278–287.
Chetty R, Looney A, Kroft K (2009) Salience and taxation: Theory
and evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(4):1145–1177.
Ellison G (2005) A model of add-on pricing. Quart. J. Econom.
120(2):585–637.
Ellison G (2006) Bounded rationality in industrial organization.
Blundell R, Newey W, Persson T, eds. Advances in Economics
and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress
of the Econometric Society, Vol. 2, Chap. 5 (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK), 142–174.
Ellison G, Ellison S (2009) Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities
on the Internet. Econometrica 77(2):427–452.
Ellison G, Wolitzky A (2012) A search cost model of obfuscation.
RAND J. Econom. 43(3):417–441.
Estelami H (1997) Consumer perceptions of multidimensional
prices. Adv. Consumer Res. 24:392–399.
European Commission (2007) Commission working document
accompanying the White paper on the integration of EU
mortgage credit markets. Accessed April 16, 2013, http://eur
-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007SC
1683:EN:HTML.
Gabaix X, Laibson D (2006) Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia,
and information suppression in competitive markets. Quart.
J. Econom. 121(2):505–540.
Guardian, The (2011) Supermarkets “confuse” consumers with
product pricing. (November 17), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
money/2011/nov/17/supermarkets-confuse-consumers-product
-pricing.
Hortaçsu A, Syverson C (2004) Product differentiation, search costs,
and competition in the mutual fund industry: A case study of
S&P 500 index funds. Quart. J. Econom. 119(2):403–456.
Hossain T, Morgan J (2006) 0 0 0Plus shipping and handling: Revenue
(non) equivalence in field experiments on eBay. B.E. J. Econom.
Anal. Policy 6(2):1–27.
Iyengar S, Kamenica E (2010) Choice proliferation, simplicity seek-
ing, and asset allocation. J. Public Econom. 94(7–8):530–539.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
92
.87
.50
.3]
 on
 23
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
14
, a
t 0
8:2
4 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Chioveanu and Zhou: Price Competition with Consumer Confusion
Management Science 59(11), pp. 2450–2469, © 2013 INFORMS 2469
Janssen M, Moraga-González JL (2004) Strategic pricing, con-
sumer search, and the number of firms. Rev. Econom. Stud.
71(4):1089–1118.
Janssen M, Moraga-González JL, Wildenbeest M (2005) Truly costly
sequential search and oligopolistic pricing. Internat. J. Indust.
Organ. 23(5–6):451–466.
Kalayci K (2011) Price complexity and buyer confusion in mar-
kets. Netspar Discussion Paper 10/2011-082. http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1944049.
Kalayci K, Potters J (2011) Buyer confusion and market prices. Inter-
nat. J. Indust. Organ. 29(1):14–22.
Kuksov D (2004) Buyer search costs and endogenous product
design. Marketing Sci. 23(4):490–499.
Kuksov D, Villas-Boas JM (2010) When more alternatives lead to
less choice. Marketing Sci. 29(3):507–524.
Morwitz V, Greenleaf E, Johnson E (1998) Divide and prosper:
Consumers’ reaction to partitioned prices. J. Marketing Res.
35(4):453–463.
Ofgem (2011) Factsheet 107—Simpler energy tariffs. (October 14),
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/97522629/Simpler-energy-tariffs.
Piccione M, Spiegler R (2012) Price competition under limited com-
parability. Quart. J. Econom. 127(4):97–135.
Rosenthal R (1980) A model in which an increase in the number of
sellers leads to a higher price. Econometrica 48(6):1575–1579.
Spiegler R (2011) Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization
(Oxford University Press, New York).
Stahl D (1989) Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer
search. Amer. Econom. Rev. 79(4):700–712.
Thomas M, Morwitz V (2009) The ease of computation effect:
The interplay of metacognitive experiences and naive theo-
ries in judgments of price differences. J. Marketing Res. 46(1):
81–91.
Tirole J (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press,
Boston).
Tversky A, Kahneman D (1981) The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science 211(4481):453–458.
Varian H (1980) A model of sales. Amer. Econom. Rev. 70(4):651–659.
Which? (2009) Customers confused about the range of energy
tariffs. (May 7), http://www.which.co.uk/switch/news/2009/
05/consumers-confused-about-range-of-energy-tariffs-186296.
Wilson C (2010) Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation.
Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 28(5):496–506.
Woodward S (2003) Consumer confusion in the mortgage mar-
ket. Working paper, Sand Hill Econometrics, Menlo Park, CA.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049629.
Woodward S, Hall R (2010) Consumer confusion in the mortgage
market: Evidence of less than a perfectly transparent and com-
petitive market. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(2):511–515.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
92
.87
.50
.3]
 on
 23
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
14
, a
t 0
8:2
4 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
